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Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Background  
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has an urgent need to understand how 
system-level reliability of an avionics architecture is compromised when portions of the 
architecture are temporarily unavailable due to single event effects (SEE). The proposed activity 
parametrically evaluated these SEE impacts on system reliability based on mission duration, 
upset rate and recovery times for a representative redundant architecture. 
The key stakeholders for this study are NASA programs and projects that expect to use avionics 
architectures with electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) parts susceptible to SEE 
when exposed to the mission expected radiation environment. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
Whether in terms of size, weight, power, speed, precision or a range of other metrics, 
commercial state-of-the-art (SOTA) electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts are 
outperforming their space-qualified counterparts by increasing margins. More and more, these 
performance advantages are becoming crucial for space missions to achieve ambitious 
performance goals. However, most of these parts are designed for terrestrial applications, and 
their use in space environments often introduces susceptibilities to single event effects (SEE) that 
may pose significant threats to mission success.  
Unless space mission design teams develop sufficient understanding of SEE susceptibilities and 
model their effects on a system, these fault and failure modes can overwhelm intended system-
level reliability and safety, resulting in system failure.  
SEEs can cause a broad range of anomalies and irrecoverable failures, including momentary 
disturbances of a part’s output to data corruption, recoverable loss of functionality, or 
catastrophic failure. Resulting system-level consequences may depend on the operating state of 
the affected part, its application in the system, and even the system’s state at the time of the SEE. 
This complex behavior has made it difficult to include SEE in most reliability estimates. 
However, the increasing use of SOTA and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts has made 
such inclusion increasingly important.   
System-level modeling can explore system sensitivity to SEE rates and consequences when 
details of the performance of constituent parts remain uncertain, and can establish upper bounds 
on the SEE rates necessary for acceptable system performance. Such sensitivity modeling results 
can guide comprehensive SEE testing of critical parts driving system performance, reliability, 
and safety. This facilitates ensuring EEE component rates remain within acceptable bounds.   
System-, element-, unit-, and component-level redundancy are approaches to mitigate SEE. 
Bounding the SEE threat is especially important when using system-level redundancy to mitigate 
errors and failures that are non-reparable at the element or individual unit level.   
This NESC study focuses primarily on:  
1) Developing methodologies for including non-reparable SEE rates and reparable SEE 
rates (with anticipated repair times) in system-level risk modeling to ensure that the 
radiation effects in electronics are not a significant mission risk contributor.   
2) Applying the results of parametric system-level risk modeling to guide the SEE 
component test and analyses efforts to ensure the bounding limits used in the model are 
appropriate.   
The NESC team developed guidelines for using system-level modeling to develop insights into 
system vulnerabilities before SEE becomes a significant threat to mission success, for identifying 
characteristics that may render a system particularly vulnerable to SEE, and for using results of 
system-level modeling to optimize testing, analysis, and verification efforts in terms of system-
level risk reduction. These guidelines are summarized below. 
Based on the studies done, the following guidelines were developed to ensure system modeling 
yields results that provide useful guidance for radiation and reliability analysis: 
1) Irreparable and reparable SEE rates should be included in system models.   
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2) Reliability and availability model sensitivities should be investigated over a range of rates 
for reparable and irreparable events and recovery times to determine the level at which 
they significantly detract from mission success. 
3) System-level models should be sufficiently complex to reflect impacts of operating 
through different mission phases and with different levels of resilience. 
4)  If system redundancy serves multiple purposes, all of these purposes must be included in 
the system models, along with their interferences with each other. 
The following guidelines were developed to ensure that SEE testing and analysis efforts make 
efficient use of system modeling results: 
1) Use results of system-level reliability and availability assessments to guide SEE test and 
analysis efforts. 
2) Bound unit and system failure rates using available data to determine whether system 
SEE rates could affect failure rates unacceptably based on system modeling results. 
3) Use testing and analysis approaches that are consistent with the program’s risk position 
and risk factors 
4) Prioritize testing based on system-level simulation results and risk, ranking, and expected 
benefits. 
5) To minimize disruption to the design process, develop work-around or redesign strategies 
for use if one or more of the parts selected for test exhibit unacceptable SEE. 
The guidelines noted above are discussed in more detail in Section 7.2. 
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5.0 SEE Threats and Use of Redundancy  
System failures can occur due to a variety of causes (e.g., mechanical failures, thermal failures, 
electrical failures, wear-out). In most systems, non-electrical failures (e.g., parachutes, engines, 
structures, tanks) dominate the system failure causes since these failure rates are bounded by 
material capabilities and physics. Electrical and avionics components are usually highly reliable 
and not a significant contributor to mission failure (on the order of <1%). Additionally, electrical 
components’ reliability can be supplemented via redundancy, making their contribution to the 
system failure rate minimal. Ensuring electronics risk does not drive mission risk by more than a 
few percent requires electronics failure rates to be orders of magnitude smaller than non-
electrical failure rates.  
Figure 1 illustrates how non-electrical failures with a system failure rate of 1 lost mission per 200 
attempted missions (99.5% probability of mission success) combine with electrical failures of 1 
loss per 20,000 attempts (99.995% probability of avionics success) to reduce the total mission 
failure rate (i.e., loss of mission (LOM)) to 1 in 198 (or a 99.495% probability of success)1. If the 
electrical failure contribution is 1% of the non-electrical failure, it will have a commensurate 
effect on the system failure rate. 
 
Figure 1. Notional Non-Electrical and Electrical Failure Rate Contributors to LOM 
Figure 1 shows that electrical failures can be classified as reparable or non-reparable. Reparable 
failures include momentary disturbances, data corruption, or loss of functionality 
(i.e., nondestructive SEE (NDSEE)), and non-reparable failures are catastrophic (i.e., destructive 
                                                 
1 Use of Commercial Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in NASA’s Commercial Crew and 
Cargo Program, TI-12-00762, 3/15/2012 
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SEE (DSEE)). This is especially important in a space environment, where nondestructive SEEs 
can temporarily result in a component failure, but not prohibit the component from recovering 
and continuing to perform its function after the repair time. Depending on the system application, 
these repairs can be automated and self-correcting or they may require an external command to 
initiate the repair cycle. In either case, the time to SEE repair and recovery must be considered in 
the reliability assessment model, especially when the recovery is not instantaneous. The recovery 
time from SEEs is application-dependent, and can vary from microseconds to minutes to hours. 
Figure 2 shows the frequency of system failure as function of the electrical failure frequency 
(e.g., due to issues with packaging, wiring, workmanship), assuming a constant non-electrical 
failure rate of 1 per 200 mission attempts. As noted above, electrical failure probabilities are 
usually a small fraction of the dominant non-electrical failure probabilities. However, as 
discussed below, SEE-induced failures can cause failures due to electrical components to rival or 
even exceed the non-electrical failure rate. 
 
Figure 2. Electrical Failure Rate Contributors to LOM 
5.1 SEE Threats 
The space radiation environment poses threats to systems that have no analog in terrestrial 
applications. These threats include dose effects and SEE. Dose effects accumulate over the life of 
the mission, resulting in degraded performance and an increasing probability of failure as the 
mission progresses. Because failure rates due to dose effects increase over time, and because this 
cumulative degradation occurs for all parts (biased or not), redundancy is ineffective as a 
mitigation approach. Applications often require application of a design margin to the dose 
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capabilities of components to ensure this failure type is negligible. In contrast, SEEs occur with a 
constant failure rate (i.e., any two identical particles have the same probability of causing the 
effect). Since radiation environments are close to “average” conditions most of the time, SEEs 
are treated as constant failure-rate processes over much of the mission and are candidates for 
redundant mitigation strategies. In this study, the NESC team concentrated on SEEs and their 
effects on redundant systems. 
SEEs occur when an ionizing particle traversing a region of the device sensitive to the effect 
(called the sensitive volume) deposits sufficient energy in that region to generate the effect. The 
part technology and application conditions determine which SEE modes are of potential concern 
for a given part. The consequences of the SEE at the system level are even more application-
dependent, depending not just on device function, but also on the system’s state when the SEE 
occurs. Figure 3 illustrates the main SEE modes and the technologies that may be susceptible to 
them.   
 
Figure 3. Main SEE Modes and Technologies that may be Susceptible 
Destructive modes are indicated in red text in the top row, while nondestructive SEEs are 
indicated by blue text. Stuck bits represent a special case, since they affect only part of the 
device (e.g., one bit in a memory) and they repair themselves (a process called annealing) over 
time. For brief definitions of the types of SEE listed in the top row of the table, see Section 10.0, 
Definition of Terms. 
The risk a SEE mode poses at the part level depends on the consequences of the mode  
(e.g., flipped bits, lost functionality, or failure) and the occurrence rate. Unfortunately, unless the 
parts used in the system are specifically intended for use in space or have a successful history in 
applicable heritage missions, these risk determinants may be unknown and must be determined 
through SEE testing and/or analysis. The standard method for revealing SEE susceptibilities and 
determining the corresponding rates is heavy-ion testing, which involves irradiating the part with 
high fluences of ions representative of the mission environment. Unfortunately, heavy-ion testing 
is costly, difficult, and time-consuming, especially for complex SOTA and COTS parts. This has 
led to development of alternative methods for identifying potential SEE risks and bounding SEE 
rates. These methods include: 
1) Use of proton SEE data to bound heavy-ion risk for parts that are highly SEE sensitive.  
2) Use of data for similar parts fabricated in the same process to identify potential SEE 
susceptibilities and bound their SEE rates.  
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3) Use of heritage data for the part in an equivalent or bounding space mission. 
The first two methods can provide bounds to SEE modes, but they cannot reliably detect or 
bound susceptibilities to all modes, especially to DSEE 2 3. Use of heritage data requires a 
thorough understanding of the similarities and differences between the completed and proposed 
missions. In addition, as will be discussed, use of heritage data for systems using redundant 
mitigation for SEE poses specific challenges. Uncertainties in NDSEE, and especially DSEE 
rates as bounded by these alternative methods, make it difficult to ensure SEE rates remain 
sufficiently low that they do not overcome mitigation. Other issues that could make SEE 
mitigation challenging include: 
1) SEE rates in space exceed terrestrial rates by many orders of magnitude. Moreover, the 
energetic and highly ionizing particles in the space environment can cause SEE modes 
that would never be seen in terrestrial applications. Unless the parts are intended and 
designed for space, the only way such threats will be revealed is through appropriate SEE 
characterization. 
2) SEE behavior in some parts involves multiple SEE modes with different consequences, 
and these may require multiple and diverse redundancy schemes.  
3) Although SEEs are Poisson processes, they are Poisson in particle flux rather than time, 
so their rates can vary throughout the spacecraft’s orbit or over time due to solar activity. 
Particle flux is a key driver to the SEE rate.  
4) Increasing use of COTS parts means that more parts selected for space systems have 
unknown SEE susceptibilities that must be revealed through expensive, technically 
demanding, and time-consuming test campaigns4. 
5) The increasing complexity of COTS parts has made it more tempting to employ alternate 
SEE test methods (e.g., board or box-level proton SEE testing). These alternate methods 
could reduce testing cost and duration, but at the expense of detailed understanding of the 
SEE susceptibilities.  
6) Mitigation of SEE complicates system designs and may result in penalties to performance 
and/or size, weight, and power (SWAP) constraints on the system design. 
5.2 Rationale for Redundancy  
Component-, unit-, element-, and system-level redundancy implementations are important 
techniques for meeting system requirements for performance, availability, and reliability even 
when the individual components making up the system do not meet required reliability. 
Redundancy is used to meet different mission requirements, including operational lifetime, 
safety and fault tolerance, error detection, and SEE threats. 
                                                 
2 R. Ladbury and M. Campola, “Bayesian methods for bounding single-event related risk in low-cost satellite 
missions,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 4464–4469, Dec. 2013. 
3 R. L. Ladbury and J.-M. Lauenstein, “Evaluating constraints on heavy-ion SEE susceptibility imposed by proton 
SEE testing and other mixed environments,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 301–308, Jan. 2017. 
4 Testing at the Speed of Light—The State of U.S. Electronic Parts Radiation Testing Infrastructure, Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, pp. 27-28 (2018). 
  
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-17-01211 Page #:  14 of 45 
For lifetime objectives, when a required unit fails, its operation could be replaced by a redundant 
component, allowing the function to continue and avoiding LOM. Redundancy is also 
implemented to satisfy safety-critical requirements for human-crewed missions. In some cases, 
even when the individual component or unit is highly reliable and each unit’s expected lifetime 
exceeds the mission timeline, redundancy may be required to meet fault tolerance requirements, 
ensuring that an unexpected component anomaly does not jeopardize the mission.    
Redundancy is employed to perform detection, localization, and reconfiguration for component 
failures. When a system must meet time-critical performance, redundancy can be used to 
instantly detect and identify the failed component. This is commonly used in computer 
applications with self-checking pairs (SCP), or it can be used as a three-for-one voting scheme. 
This redundancy for fault detection isolation and recovery (FDIR) can be applied at multiple 
levels (e.g., the component, subsystem, or system level).  
Finally, redundancy is used to handle environmental effects, including temporary disruption of a 
function due to SEE, which is the focus of this study.  
It is important to note that when a leg of redundancy is removed due to transient or permanent 
failure, the system will be operating in a degraded state. The loss of a single string due to SEE, 
even temporarily, will have an impact on system reliability, availability, and performance. If the 
SEE responses of the components in a system are poorly understood, then SEE fault rates may 
dwarf those due to other causes. This can be a significant concern. Conventional reliability 
calculations do not consider SEE-induced faults, because parts for space applications were 
selected for their SEE immunity. However, in a system where COTS parts are used, such 
immunity is not assured. Even if all SEE modes are recoverable, the design must account for the 
unavailability of the recovering element to serve as a redundant backup during recovery from an 
SEE. 
5.2.1 Redundancy Implementation to Improve System Performance 
To explore how the redundancy can be used to meet the mission lifetime requirements, assume 
that a critical system for a short mission (e.g., a 15-minute launch-vehicle mission) must achieve 
99.5% reliability considering only electrical failures. If the system uses three units configured 
into redundant elements to meet its required performance, then the unit failure rate can be as high 
as 0.75 failure per hour. The second unit performs the function after the first unit fails, and the 
third unit completes the mission after the first and second units have failed. Therefore, the 
mission reliability expectation can be met by using redundant elements to replace the failed 
components. It would take three concurrent or overlapping component failures to compromise 
mission reliability. 
5.2.2 Redundancy Implementation for Safety-critical Functions 
Redundancy also enables system performance to address unanticipated failures or errors of 
components required in critical functions. Even when individual parts are expected to last the 
entire mission, redundancy is designed into the system to address unknown and unanticipated 
loss of components due to external events. Many of NASA’s human-rated systems for launch 
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vehicles,5 International Space Station (ISS) visiting vehicles,6 and inhabited orbiting platforms 
(e.g., Deep-Space Gateway, commercial platforms) have requirements for specific levels of fault 
tolerance. These redundant implementations are irrespective of the implementation to address 
reliability, performance, and known environmental conditions 
5.2.3 Redundancy Implementation for FDIR 
Redundancy is used for the FDIR function coverage. If triple redundancy is employed and all 
three elements are available and operational, then their outputs can be voted to correct errors that 
occur within any single unit. This implementation may be used to replace internal types of FDIR 
(e.g., rate or range limits, model comparison) the units would need to employ if the redundant 
components were not available for direct comparison. Many complex systems have used 
redundant implementations to simplify the internal built-in test and FDIR software development, 
test, and qualification typically used to detect circuit faults and errors. With a voting or 
comparison strategy, detecting a circuit or component experiencing an anomaly is 
straightforward. When all three units are available (3:3), the system can detect the faulty string 
and continue seamless operation with the remaining healthy strings. If only two of the three units 
are available (2:3), the outputs can be compared to detect discrepancies and prevent propagation 
of an error (e.g., by entering a safe state and requesting intervention or by retrying the 
calculation).  
Figure 4 illustrates a system where non-electrical causes contribute 1 mission failure every 200 
missions in series with an electrical element consisting of three units. Only when all three units 
fail does the element (and therefore the mission) fail. The element is considered 3-for-1 or 3:1 
redundant, since the survival of any of the three redundant units constitutes mission success.  
                                                 
5 ISS Crew Transportation and Services Requirements Document, CCT-REQ-1130 Rev D-1, 3-23-2015 
6 International Space Station (ISS) to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Interface Requirements 
Document (IRD), SSP-50808 Rev F, 9-2014 
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Figure 4. Probabilities of Retaining Voting, Comparison, and Service Availability  
(Note: All failure rates are per mission) 
The unit failure rate on the upper x-axis corresponds to the electrical element failure rate (as a 
percentage of the 1-in-200-mission non-electrical failure rate). The red curve corresponds to the 
probability that at least one unit remains functional throughout the mission. It is much less 
probable that 2 of 3 units remain functional (which would allow detection of random errors in the 
units by comparing unit outputs—yellow curve). Still less probable is the situation where all 
three units in the element remain functional (turquoise curve), which allows errors to be detected 
and corrected by voting the unit outputs.  
The purpose of adding redundant elements to a system is to ensure system-level success even as 
individual units fail. However, these failures affect system resilience, capabilities, and reliability. 
Loss of a single unit in a 3:1 system degrades system resilience with respect to survivability and 
availability while that unit is recovering. However, if the three strings are being used to vote out 
errors in individual elements, then a single-element failure results in loss of capability to isolate 
and correct errors. Therefore, a SEE can result in the system becoming zero-fault tolerant.   
The impact of such degradation is application-specific. However, if the application is sufficiently 
important to merit redundancy to improve performance, then assessing the degradation of these 
system capabilities is warranted.   
Moreover, if recovering (i.e., full operations) for the affected unit requires the system to be reset 
or resynchronized, each unit/box level error results in a temporary system-level outage. Using 
system-level redundancy to mitigate unit/box level SEE failures will degrade system-level 
strategies for performance and redundancy.  
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5.3 Redundancy Implementation to Mitigate SEE  
Use of system-level redundancy to mitigate the effects of radiation, for transient errors and 
permanent failures, is a relatively new trend. Over the past seven decades, the susceptibility of 
electrical components to radiation has usually been addressed at the component level, 
independent from system-level redundancy implementation. 
The components selected for the specific space environment were designed and tested to 
withstand the radiation level without experiencing transient effects or permanent damage. 
Unfortunately, the performance of such space-qualified parts significantly lags the most 
advanced commercial parts. As commercial electronics became more complex, their use in space 
environments resulted in a higher frequency of SEEs and new DSEE and NDSEE modes. Some 
commercial parts withstood radiation threats adequately while enabling essential performance 
advantages in their application. However, since the commercial parts were usually designed 
without consideration of radiation performance, it was impossible to determine which 
components would perform acceptably without radiation qualification efforts.    
As demand for these higher performance components increased to enable the required functional 
performance, additional techniques were used to evaluate SEE. In simple cases of the various 
implementation of read-only memory (ROM) and random-access memory (RAM), these 
techniques would detect and correct single and double flipped bits on memory addresses. Some 
of these techniques (e.g., error detection and correction (EDAC)) could be checksums of large 
memory functions, or dedicated additional bits, to correct bit flips in memory. As each memory 
word was accessed, these additional bits would be used to detect, validate, and correct bit flips 
caused by a SEE in near real-time. 
As circuits became more complex, with SEE affecting logic and decision gates within 
processors, application-specific integrated circuits, and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), 
EDAC routines were not sufficient to detect all errors. In these cases, manufacturers of space-
rated parts began implementing internal, component-level redundancy to address SEE-related 
errors. FPGAs employed internal triple-modular redundancy (TMR), where the function 
performed by the FPGA was replicated within the device and then voted by a radiation-hardened 
circuit to ensure the output would be correct in the presence of single errors. 
Certain digital processing implementations employed SCPs, where computations were performed 
by two identical circuits and executed simultaneously to produce identical results. If the two 
outputs did not match identically, then an error would be detected and the process would be re-
executed on a redundant pair of processors. 
A critical point to all of these component-internal SEE mitigation strategies is that the radiation-
induced error was handled at the component level. Specifically, any additional circuitry for this 
mitigation (e.g., EDAC bits, TMR gates, or dual SCP processors) were considered in the 
component’s failure rates. This additional circuitry, employed to mitigate SEE, incurred a 
reliability penalty for those components. This internal SEE mitigation was automatically 
incorporated into the system-level reliability and availability model since it was included in the 
component-level failure rate. 
When a subsystem box employs internal SEE mitigation strategies to address SEE-induced 
outages (e.g., error-correcting codes, internal voting), there is no need to use mission-level 
redundancy to back up critical functions. However, when a subsystem cannot repair SEE 
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internally, (e.g., processor exceptions and software crashes) some architectures employ mission-
level redundancy to maintain critical functions. Repairing or restoring the subsystem sometimes 
necessitates resynchronizing redundant elements, resulting in temporary unavailability of all 
redundancies. 
Mitigating SEE with system-level redundancy poses specific challenges, including: 
1) SEE behavior in certain components involves multiple SEE modes with different 
consequences that may require multiple and diverse redundancy schemes.  
2) Redundancy-based mitigation strategies are costly in terms of their effects on the 
system’s SWAP.  
3) Restoring full functionality after an SEE often requires taking the entire redundant system 
offline to re-set and resynchronize its constituent units. 
Today’s challenge is that when radiation mitigation has been elevated to the system level, the 
reliability impact of the SEE on system performance must be appropriately addressed in the 
system model, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), and reliability model (e.g., Reliability Block 
Diagram, or RBD).  
6.0 System Modeling 
The NESC team started with a typical triple-redundant cross-strapped system architecture used in 
mission-critical applications. A standard RBD model was developed to characterize this 
architecture with representative failure rates for the electrical units. The error rates due to DSEE 
and NDSEE events were included for a subset of those elements. Representative repair times 
were added for SEE recovery of transient effects. The mission duration, functional criticality, 
and various operational constraints (i.e., 2 of 3 and 1 of 3 required) were considered in the 
analyses in Section 7.  
6.1 Modeling Methodology 
The NESC team chose a modeling approach to evaluate various SEEs on systems based on the 
comparative approach used in an earlier NESC assessment.7 This assessment recognized that 
there is neither a “generic architecture” nor a “typical division” of failure rates between electrical 
and non-electrical system elements. No all-encompassing generic mission profile bounds 
mission-critical activities with natural and induced environments. However, to perform a 
quantitative analysis for this study, the NESC team defined an architecture and failure rate 
apportionment.   
6.1.1 Redundant Architecture Description 
Figure 5 shows the notional electronics architecture used for the relative comparisons as a 
simplified RBD8 form for a system of three redundant subsystems. As in the referenced work, 
the notional architecture consists of 24 cross-strapped system elements (e.g., avionics boxes) in 
series, each with a baseline mean time between failure (MTBF) of 500,000 (500K) hours 
                                                 
7 TI-12-00762, Use of Commercial Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in NASA's 
Commercial Crew Program (CCP), March 2012 
8 Reliability Block Diagram Modeling- Comparisons of Three Software Packages, Brall, A.; Hagen, W.; Tran H. 
2007 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 
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corresponding to a failure rate of 2x10-6 per hour. The origination of the 24-box architecture and 
the selection of a typical average failure rate is detailed in the footnote 8 reference. 
The contribution of the non-electrical failures is depicted on the left of the RBD as a constant 
LOM rate of 1 of 200 missions. DSEEs are treated as a constant failure rate process, adding this 
rate to the 1 in 500K hours constant electrical failure rate for susceptible units. NDSEEs were 
treated separately and modeled as an availability prediction since they are reparable.  
Figure 5 also shows the constant electrical failure rate (i.e., MTBF) of 1 failure per 500K hours 
plus the DSEEs, for susceptible units, in the blue section of the RBD. These constant failure rates 
apply for the duration of the mission. The standard reliabilty equation based on a constant failure 
rate over time  calculates the success probability. The figure shows NDSEEs as the orange 
section, with the last three system elements #22, #23, and #24 with NDSEEs.  
The modeling approach to calculate the effects of NDSEE used the standard availability equation 
 
 
Figure 5. Simplified Example Three-String Redundant Architecture 
The modeling example used in this study divides SEE into two categories (reparable and 
irreparable). DSEE modes are non-reparable. NDSEE modes are reparable, provided the system 
has the resources and opportunity to repair them. The exception is for short missions or mission 
phases (i.e., <1 hour) where the mission/phase is too critical or too short to tolerate any system 
down time. 
For missions longer than ~1 hour, NDSEEs are reparable, allowing the affected unit to resume 
operations after a finite repair time (TR). The model varies the rate for reparable and non-
reparable SEE (RR and RI) and the reparable time (TR) to vary, while electrical unit failure rate 
(RE) remains constant.   
e-λt 
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All 24 elements have a destructive constant electrical unit failure susceptibility with rate RE. 
Units 22 through 24 have a constant DSEE rate and a nondestructive failure rate and repair time 
(i.e., the reciprocal of the MTBF and a mean time to repair (MTTR)) modeled as availability.   
System-level non-voting architectures (e.g., 3:1 configuration) correct errors by “failing silent,” 
allowing use of the outputs of the remaining two strings by the succeeding subsystem. If a 
second unit of the same element is lost, errors in the remaining element can propagate to the next 
system element.    
System-level voting architectures (e.g., 2-out-of-3 configuration) correct errors by voting the 
outputs of the three strings after each element, providing results to the succeeding subsystem. If a 
unit of an element is lost to a SEE, then errors in one of the two remaining corresponding units 
results in total system loss due to inconsistent results between the remaining units.  
The system-level model depicted in Figure 5 allows repair of nondestructive faults, allowing 
them to be treated as an “availability” term, shown in orange, in series with the destructive and 
other constant failure sources, shown in blue. This limits the impact of a nondestructive event to 
a single repair time. The model simulates the number of failures (i.e., three strings failed due to 
DSEE or accumulation of NDSEE) and the number of times failures and outages occur, and the 
average time spent with one or two strings failed as a function of DSEE and NDSEE rates, 
mission duration, and repair time.  
6.1.2 Mission Phases 
Figure 6 shows a simulated 30-day mission divided into several phases. The two red phases 
indicate 15-minute mission-critical periods where repair is not possible due to ascent and entry, 
descent, and landing (EDL) flight phases. During these mission-critical phases, repairing via 
“resynchronizing” or “rebooting” the system architecture is not possible, since repair strategies 
involve removing all redundant elements from the system. 
The orange zone in Figure 6, starting at day 10 for 6 hours, indicates a mission-critical time 
period where a 15-minute repair period is possible, unlike the red zone. In this case, 
resynchronizing or rebooting the system architecture is possible, since removing all redundant 
elements from the system pauses the mission temporarily without LOM as long as the repair 
restores the impacted element within 15 minutes. 
Figure 6’s green zone indicates non-mission-critical periods where resynchronizing or rebooting 
the system architecture is possible because removing all redundant elements from the system has 
a temporary effect from the repair strategy. Even if all three strings are removed, the mission is 
not affected, since the system can be brought back after the 15-minute repair time. 
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Figure 6. Assigning Avionics Criticality by Mission Phase 
6.1.3 Integrating Mission Phases into the Model 
This section applies the red mission-critical, orange mission-critical with repair, and green 
noncritical mission phases to various mission scenarios. 
Figure 7 shows the fully integrated RBD model, with time-phased mission implementation. The 
non-electrical contribution of 1 of 200 missions is unchanged. The system is susceptible to 
random component failure and destructive events caused by radiation during the entire mission, 
as depicted in the blue segment. The two short non-reparable mission phases can be modeled as 
separate RBD blocks with limited time exposure, as depicted in the red phases. The mission-
critical mid-time phase portion of the model can be implemented as a different RBD block, with 
repairs possible as an availability, as depicted in the orange section of Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. Model of Constant “Destructive” Failure Rates plus the Three Periods of NDSEE (11x17 paper size)
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System modeling efforts early in the design can use existing or historical SEE rates for parts in 
the system. For new systems with unknown SEE rates, system modeling can determine upper 
limits for SEE rates that would allow the system to operate successfully. These limits are useful 
during design and qualification processes. 
The modeling approach described in this study investigates a range of DSEE and NDSEE rates, 
starting at low values and raising them until the system failure rate climbs into the unacceptable 
range. In parallel with varying the rates, the model can vary other parameters (e.g., mission 
duration, repair time). This allows determination of the SEE rate upper bounds as a function of 
model parameters, ensuring SEE occurring with other random errors will not overwhelm 
intended system redundancy strategies.  
Based on a comparison of these upper bounds to what is known about the system and the SEE 
behavior of parts proposed for the system, modeling results provides guidance for prioritizing 
part level testing and analysis to reduce system risk most efficiently. 
6.2 Mission Profiles 
The system’s operational use and the mission duration are as important as the system architecture 
during modeling of system-level consequences of SEEs. Section 6.1 describes three critical 
mission phases, each with specific usage strategies affecting system performance with respect to 
faults and SEE recovery. To consider these operational use cases and mission duration, the 
following sections describe examples of three distinct mission types. 
6.2.1 Short Critical Mission Type or Phase (Red) 
Figure 8 depicts a 30-minute mission duration with the first 15 mission-critical minutes (red 
zone) followed by a noncritical (green) phase. Mission-critical 15-minute phases are 
characteristic of a launch vehicle or a spacecraft performing a critical phase during an extended 
mission (e.g., on-orbit rendezvous with another spacecraft or EDL to an asteroid or planetary 
surface). During these short missions, the system requires active continuous system control. 
There is no opportunity to pause the mission, place the spacecraft in a safe mode, and reset  
(i.e., repair by resynchronizing) electronics that suffered a NDSEE. Therefore, all SEEs are non-
reparable during the 15-minute red zone. During a mission-critical period, modeling the NDSEE 
failure rate involves applying the SEE MTBF as a constant failure rate for those 15 minutes. 
Figure 8. Short 30-minute Mission with First 15 Minutes Mission-Critical 
6.2.2  Long Duration Critical Mission Type or Phase (Orange) 
The next mission type represents a 1-year duration, as shown in Figure 9. During such a critical 
mission, shown in orange, mission success requires continuous system performance or a type of 
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satellite. This mission phase could pertain to a communication satellite, where the instrument 
must continually monitor and transmit its signal, or to an Earth-observing or weather satellite 
that must continually monitor the Earth’s atmosphere.    
These missions require the system to operate continuously, regardless of the rate and 
consequences of SEE. During this mission-critical phase, redundant elements must remain 
operational even when SEE occurs. As long as at least one of the three redundant units within 
each element remains operational, the mission continues to operate successfully. 
Figure 9. Long Duration Critical Mission  
6.2.3 Long Duration Noncritical Mission Type of Phase (Green) 
The last mission phase, or type shown as green in Figure 10, represents a noncritical phase where 
repair can involve a resynchronization or rebooting of SEE susceptible elements. This is an 
application requiring the system to operate at certain times of the mission, but having long 
phases of transit or mission operations that do not require active control or monitoring.   
Examples include a mission where the loss of a complete subsystem due to a combination of 
reparable SEE and failure (for any reason) would not result in the system loss. This could be a 
failure of the navigation or control system during quiescent flight, where no active control is 
essential. It could mean the temporary loss of the environmental control and life support system 
where the existing reserves on the spacecraft are sufficient to sustain the system during the 
temporary outage.   
Such events could result in LOM performance for a time period, but would not cause a complete 
system loss. Although the subsystem is disrupted by a SEE, in these cases the system returns 
back online with a function recovery and reset. Moreover, if multiple SEEs cause the system to 
fail, it will recover after a system reset and continue its mission. This same type of mission phase 
applies for a critical mission (i.e., a science mission) requiring continuous service. In this case, 
although the service is disrupted and observation time is lost, the entire system is not lost and 
functionality, along with the lost opportunity, is recovered after a system reset.   
The distinguishing characteristic of this mission phase is its reduced susceptibility to reparable 
SEEs. Such events result only in those temporary anomalies resulting in a system outage 
followed by restoration of on-orbit service continuing the mission. 
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Figure 10. Long Duration Not-Critical Mission with Mission-Critical Periods  
6.2.4 Time-Phased Missions (Red, Orange, and Green) 
The modeling done for this study investigated the effects of SEE on a time-phased mission. 
Figure 10 shows a sequence where system criticality changes during the mission. Consider an 
ISS visiting vehicle, required to rendezvous with a human-inhabited outpost to replenish supplies 
and return the crew to Earth. This is a 30-day mission with multiple phases.   
The first phase includes a mission-critical (red) liftoff and ascent phase to low Earth orbit. This 
red phase is representative of a short mission duration where no repair is possible. The 
requirements and performance of this phase are commensurate with the implementation 
described in Section 6.2.1. The system must continually operate with no disruption of service 
and without component recovery. 
The second phase of the mission includes a multi-day transit to the ISS or other outpost, shown 
in green. During this time, the spacecraft is mostly on a minimally controlled trajectory path to 
the rendezvous location with no continuous active control required for safety-critical functions. 
If a SEE caused a temporary upset in a function (i.e., the attitude control subsystem), then a reset 
and resynchronization of the subsystem would fully restore its functionality. This phase of the 
mission is representative of a long duration, noncritical part of the mission, and the success 
expectation is modeled as described in Section 6.2.2. The complete system outage is allowed as 
long as recovery of the lost function is possible. 
The third phase of the mission represents a highly active mission requiring continuous system 
operation, shown in orange. This phase includes proximity operations and rendezvous phase of 
the spacecraft to the ISS or a similar outpost. During this phase, the system must remain 
operational with no disruption in service. The attitude control system cannot experience a 
temporary outage of service, since an uncontrolled spacecraft in this vicinity could result in a 
collision. However, SEE repairs and recovery are possible during this phase since there are 
typically hold and safe states during the phase that allow for subsystem reset and recovery.   
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Although these systems require a level of redundancy for fault tolerance and safety 
considerations, as long as a single string of the system remains operational during this time 
period, the system remains functional. When all three strings of the subsystems are lost, due to 
failure or consecutive SEE upsets, the subsystem outage results in system loss. This phase of the 
mission is considered a critical mission phase, and the performance expectation is described in 
Section 6.2.3. One operational string is necessary at all times, with failed elements returned on 
line within the specified repair time. 
The next phase of the mission represents a docked condition where the vehicle is physically 
attached to the remote output and not required to support continuous noncritical green operation 
actively. Alternatively, it could be a second transit phase of the mission, where the vehicle is no 
longer in proximity to the outpost and transitioning to a new location. In these applications, a 
temporary outage of any function would not result in a LOM. This would be identical to the 
system performance described in Section 6.2.2. 
The final phase of the mission includes EDL as the spacecraft returns to the Earth or descends to 
another planetary body. This is similar to the short mission phase described in Section 6.2.1, 
where the system functions are critical and need to be continuously operational. This operational 
restriction precludes the ability to repair or recover lost assets due to a temporary error. Any loss 
of the required function, even temporarily would result in a system loss. 
The effects of combining these distinct mission phases into a comprehensive mission profile and 
the resulting mission performance expectation is illustrated and discussed in Section 7.  
7.0 Results and Discussion 
The results presented are based on the models discussed in Section 6, where the non-electrical 
and non-SEE upset rates were held constant. The NESC team analyzed the sensitivity of these 
simplified models to various parameters, including rates for reparable and non-reparable SEE 
modes, repair time for reparable modes, and mission duration. The team examined the 
probability of system failure as a function of the distribution of reparable and non-reparable rates 
across the sensitive avionics units (i.e., 22 through 24 in the three redundant strings), as shown in 
Figure 7.   
7.1 System Modeling Results 
First, the NESC team evaluated the importance of mission lifetime, beginning with very short 
missions or mission phases where repair of NDSEE modes is not possible. Then the team 
examined how the probability of suffering system outage increases as a function of the mission 
lifetime and operational requirements.   
7.1.1 Very Short Mission Durations 
During very short missions or mission phases (e.g., 15 minutes), operations may be too critical, 
and the mission duration too short, to allow for repair of NDSEE and other potentially reparable 
faults. Missions of this type include launch, EDL to Earth, and in some cases, operations in 
proximity to another space vehicle or astronomical body. For such missions, any error or failure 
mode is effectively irreparable. Because NDSEE modes typically occur at rates orders of 
magnitude higher than DSEE, these NDSEE modes will dominate the unit and system failure 
rates.   
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For such short missions, non-electrical failures dominated the system failure probability and 
were constant at 1 in 200 missions. Electrical failure rates were constant at 500K hours MTBF in 
units 1 through 24. The SEE failure rate was varied to investigate the impact of these rates on the 
system failure probability. Figure 11 illustrates that SEE would have to occur at a rate of about 
2 to 2.5 per day per unit to reduce mission success probability by 1% below that due to non-SEE 
causes.   
Figure 11. SEE Rates Would Need to be High (>1 per day) to Significantly Impact Failures  
for Short Missions 
7.1.2 Longer Missions 
The probability that at least one SEE occurs increases with mission duration. This means  
SEE-induced failure probabilities are more likely to be commensurate with or even exceed non-
avionics failure probabilities for longer missions.     
Moreover, because of uncertainties on SEE rates due to incomplete SEE characterization testing, 
the system SEE failure rate may not be known with precision. For this reason, the NESC team 
examined how system outage rates respond to variation of key model parameters.   
The NESC team began by looking only at reparable SEE modes. The team assumed when a SEE 
takes a unit offline (e.g., one unit of element 22), the system continues to operate, with the 
remaining instantiations of that element’s unit filling in for the affected string. After a nominal 
repair time, the affected unit is returned to service and the system functions nominally. Only if 
all three units in any single element (e.g., element 22) are affected by SEE during a single repair 
time does the system experience a service outage. The consequences of the outage depend on the 
application. The outage may recover automatically; it may recover after intervention by ground 
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systems after a nominal outage time; or the outage may be irrecoverable. For this study, 
automatic recovery was assumed.   
As long as the repair time is sufficiently short and the reparable rate is sufficiently low, the 
probability of accumulating three SEEs in a single repair interval is negligible compared to the  
1-in-200-mission non-electrical failure rate. However, as mission lifetime increases, there are 
more chances for such an event to occur, much as the chance of rolling snake eyes with a pair of 
dice increases with the number of rolls. Figure 12 illustrates how the probability of a system 
outage increases as the mission duration lengthens over a range of SEE rates and repair times, 
with a constant electrical failure rate. Because recovery is assumed, Figure 12 illustrates the 
outage probability differences due to reparable SEE.    
The reparable SEE rate (RR) for each unit varies from 0.055 to 0.22 per day. Three repair times 
(TR) (e.g., 6, 18, and 60 minutes) were reviewed.  
Figure 12.  Outage Probability as a Function of Reparable SEE Rate and Repair Time  
As mission duration increases, SEE can become a significant driver of system outages even 
when they are reparable. Figure 13 shows the trend extended to mission durations of 10K hours.  
Note that the nonlinear increase in outage rate with mission duration arises because the system is 
still susceptible to electrical failures at a rate of 1 in 500K hours per unit. 
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Figure 13.  System Outage Rate vs Reparable SEE Rate and Repair Time for Longer Missions  
From Figures 12 and 13, the SEE rate and repair time are important in ensuring reparable SEEs 
do not compromise mission success, especially as mission lifetime increases. 
The influence of irreparable SEE was discussed for very short missions. As mission lifetime 
increases, the increasing probability of such events can affect mission success and resilience if 
they occur at a sufficiently high rate (see Figure 14).   
Figure 14 shows system failure probability as the rate of irreparable SEE increases from 0.0011 
to 0.0055 per unit per day. System outage rates rise nonlinearly with unit DSEE rates. 
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Figure 14. System Failure Probability as Rate of Non-reparable Rates Increases 
When reparable and irreparable modes occur, the mission length becomes more important. This 
is because the probability of an irreparable SEE mode accumulates over time, increasing the 
likelihood that the system is less resilient to NDSEE near the end of life. (See Figure 5). 
Because outages in a redundant system require multiple failures, the probability of such outages 
increases nonlinearly with mission lifetime and reparable and irreparable SEE rates. The 
probability of outage is approximately linear with repair time. 
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Figure 15. Probability of System Outage Occurring During 1000-hour Mission  
Due to Reparable and Irreparable SEE 
As noted, the cross-strapping of SEE-susceptible avionics units means outage probability is 
driven by the most sensitive unit rather than by average sensitivity. Figure 16 explores how the 
distribution of reparable and irreparable errors among units 22 through 24 affects outage 
probability. The irreparable SEE rate plays a significant role in driving system outage 
probability.  
Figure 16.  Dependence of System Outage Rate on Distribution of SEE Rate  
Throughout Susceptible Units 
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The weakest unit in a cross-strapped architecture drives the system failure rate, especially if 
redundant units are identical.   
7.1.2.1 System Degradation due to SEE 
Although these analyses have been concerned with system outages, the loss of one or more units 
within an element can have important consequences for the mission. Exactly what these 
consequences are depends on the system application and the tasks being performed by the 
redundant units. At the very least, temporary or permanent loss of a unit reduces the resilience of 
that system to errors and failures.   
If, in addition to ensuring system availability, the redundancy is being used to correct errors that 
occur in the units that make up each string, then system performance can be compromised. For 
example, Element 22 has three units (i.e., 22A, 22B, and 22C). The cross-strapping in the system 
allows unit 22B or 22C to fill in while unit 22A is offline. However, if an error causes a disparity 
in output between 22B and 22C, it would be unclear which unit was correct. Even if these units 
had the ability to compare outputs, they would not be able to isolate and resolve the error. 
Moreover, the recovery after an outage in a unit may require taking the system out of service for 
a nominal recovery time to resynchronize the redundant elements. Given these possible impacts, 
it is useful to consider the expected time that errors and failure modes may result in one or more 
electrical units experiencing an outage during a 1K-hour mission. Table 1 shows the expected 
totals for events and resulting periods of unit outages for the three contributors: non-radiation 
causes (i.e., 1 per 500K hours for each of the 72 units in the model), irreparable SEE  
(1 per 900 days per electrical unit), and reparable SEE (0.11 event per day per electrical unit, 
with an 18-minute repair time).     
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-17-01211 Page #:  33 of 45 
Table 1. Expected Unit Outages and Failures and Their Consequences for 1000-Hour Mission 
Non-Radiation 
1/500K hours per unit 
Irreparable SEE 
1/900 days per 
electrical unit 
Reparable SEE 0.11 event 
per day per electrical unit; 
18 min. unavailability per 
event 
Expected # per 1000 
hours 
0.134 0.34 41.67 
Mean time in degraded 
Condition 
68.7 hours 182 hours 12.5 hours 
The most obvious aspect of the entries in Table 1 is that the amount of time the system is in a 
degraded state due to reparable SEE is significantly less than other causes. Although irreparable 
SEE and non-radiation errors occur much less frequently (i.e., less than one expected per 
mission) the system outage time is greater. This is because the outage duration for reparable SEE 
is limited to a single repair time, while outages for irreparable SEE and non-radiation failures last 
from when they occur until the end of the mission. 
7.1.3 Phased Critical Mission 
Next, consider the effects of SEE to the system success probability over the entire mission 
timeline, where the operational system requirements change over the mission duration. For this 
portion of the study, the NESC team assumed that the DSEE rate in all units is negligible 
compared to the electronics failure rate of 1 per 2 million hours. Figure 18 illustrates a 30-minute 
mission where the first half of the mission operation does not allow repair, and the second  
15 minutes allows for SEE recovery. An example of such a mission would be a launch vehicle’s 
upper stage, where the avionics must continuously control the vehicle during ascent and then, 
after achieving orbit, has a small quiescent time period to recover from anomalies before another 
orbital burn is required.  
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Figure 18. LOM and Electronics Failure Rate: First 30 Minutes 
There are two scales for the y-axis; the leftmost scale depicts the probability of losing all three 
electrical strings during the mission time. This outer scale depicts one loss of electrical 
components given between 4,000,000 and 40,000,000 attempts. The inner scale depicts the LOM 
probability from 1 loss in 199.99 attempts to 1 loss in 200 attempts. 
The plot illustrates the effects of three different failure and SEE rates for the same system 
architecture, as described in Section 6.  
The red line at the top of the chart shows the results of a baseline system that does not experience 
SEE-induced transient upsets.  
The blue line illustrates a similar system that implements lower grade parts (with failure rate 
8 times higher) than the baseline system. This would be a system that does not employ space-
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-17-01211 Page #:  35 of 45 
qualified parts, but uses military or industrial grade parts with a lower MTBF (but ignoring SEE 
susceptibility). 
The orange line depicts the same architecture and operations, but uses the higher quality parts as 
in the baseline system and also considers the effect of transient upsets caused by radiation. The 
rate at which the upset occurs is assumed to be 1 upset per unit every 240 hours. 
Three key items should be noted from Figure 18.  
1) There is a relatively small effect to the component failure rate over such a short duration
mission with this level of redundancy, when SEEs are not considered.
2) The SEE influence on system probability has a greater impact than the part quality.
3) The main contribution of SEE to the system failure rate occurs during the active mission
phase (i.e., red), where recovery is not possible. Once the system enters the phase where
recovery is allowed (i.e., orange), the rate of decreasing mission success is consistent
with the rate of system success where SEEs are not considered.
The third point indicates that when SEE errors occur during a mission phase that makes their 
recovery impossible or difficult, SEE rate and time of exposure contribute significantly to 
mission failure probability. 
Figure 19 plots a 30-day mission and illustrates the rapid increase in system failure probability 
due to effects of SEUs during time-critical ascent and entry mission phases. 
The same redundant architecture is considered with different assumptions on the component 
failure rate and the SEE upset rate. The y-axis contains the same two scales depicting electrical 
failure contribution and total system failure. The x-axis has been extended to the 30-day timeline 
with critical non-reparable phase (depicted in red), noncritical reparable mission phases (depicted 
in green), and critical reparable phases (depicted in orange).    
The red line at the top of the figure shows the baseline system neglecting SEEs. The second solid 
purple line illustrates the baseline system, where reparable SEEs are considered. SEEs were 
assumed to occur at 1 upset per 240 hours per unit, and the recovery of the upset component is 
completed within 15 minutes. SEEs have a minimal effect on the 1 of 3 system failure 
probability. 
When the SEE rate increases to 1 upset every 24 hours there are three significant drops in the 
system reliability, as seen in the brownish third line, the upper line with steps. The first and last 
occurred during the 15-minute phase where SEE recovery was not possible. This would be 
expected since the high rate of SEE overwhelms the system redundancy. A notable result of this 
analysis is the significant increase in the system failure probability that occurs during the 6-hour 
critical mission phase where SEE recovery is possible. This is important to consider when using 
SEE susceptible parts that must continue to provide critical functions. Depending on the SEE 
upset and recovery rate, these contributions can have a severe detrimental effect to the system 
probability. 
The fourth dashed blue line compares the effects of using significantly worse parts, neglecting 
SEE. This plot shows a purely continuous decreasing trend to the system probability that is 
driven by the constant failure rates of the units.   
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The fifth curve (i.e., orange) depicts the results when the SEE rate is doubled to 1 upset every 
12 hours. The more dramatic SEE contribution to mission failure is illustrated in Figure 19 and 
indicates the importance of being able to bound the SEE rates. This plot illustrates where SEE 
susceptibility in high-quality parts will provide a higher risk than using lower grade parts 
(neglecting SEE susceptibility). 
 
 
Figure 19. LOM and Electronics Failure Rate: First 30 Days 
 
Figure 20 extends the 30-day mission to 365 days to illustrate the effects of the SEE over an 
extended exposure. The different upset and recovery rates remain the same; only the time line 
has changed. The identical step drops during SEE exposure are evident, and the exponential 
system decay probability subsequent to these SEE-induced operational constraints is illustrated. 
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This chart shows that after the SEE susceptible mission phases are complete, the system failure is 
driven entirely by the component failure rate and the part grade can have a significant influence 
over longer mission duration. 
  
Figure 20. LOM and Electronics Failure Rate 365 Days with SEU Repair 
Figure 21 shows the results of requiring at least one string to be operational at all times. There is 
no quiescent period where the system outage will not affect mission success. In this example, 
only the first 15-minute phase is considered non-reparable. After this initial phase, all transient 
SEEs are reparable with the 15-minute recovery time. As long as the recovery time is two orders 
of magnitude quicker than the expected upset rate, the effect on LOM is negligible. In this 
mission example, the effects of the SEE on the LOM are driven by the 15-minute non-reparable 
phase. 
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Figure 21. LOM and Electronics Failure Rate 365 Days with SEU Repair 
7.1.4 Comparison of SEE on Different Architectures 
Figure 22 compares the case of zero SEE rate to that where the SEE upset interval and 
subsequent15-minute repair create a 1% increase on LOM for various system-level architectures.  
Figure 22 assumes a 100% mission-critical scenario and compares several architectures, 
includng: 1 of 3 cross-strap, 2 of 3 cross-strap, and 1 of 3 block redundant architectures over a 
30-day and a 1-year time span. In addition, the effects of a nominal EEE destructive failure rate 
for all parts and a failure rate 8 times worse for all EEE parts in all units are considered.  
Using the modeling techniques described in Section 6, relative comparisons show several 
interesting relative results illustrating the dramatic influence of system architectures on the 
interval between mission failures: 
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1) In a 1 of 3 cross-strapped architecture, parts with destructive failure rates 8 times 
worse than the baseline results in the same mission level degradation as having  
1 of the 24 elements knocked offline for 15 minutes by an SEE every 8.3 hours, or  
3 of 24 elements experiencing 15-minute outages for SEE every 12 hours. 
2) For a 2 of 3 cross-strapped architecture, experiencing an upset every 102 hours 
decreases the interval between mission failures by 1%, while the 1 of 3 block 
redundant architecture requires an upset every 12 hours to reduce its mission-failure 
interval by the same 1%. 
3) A 1 of 3 cross-strapped system has similar decrease in mission-level failure interval 
from 30 days to 1 year time span. A 2 of 3 cross-strap system and a 1 of 3 block 
redundant system have similar failure interval reduction as a 1 of 3 system for the 
shorter 30 day mission, but the latter has a much lower interval between failure for a 
1 year mission (1 in 22 to 38). 
Figure 22 shows how different architectures have dramatically different tolerance to reparable 
upset rates. 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of SEE Rates and Architectures Resulting in 1% Reliability Degradation 
7.2 Implications of Modeling Results 
The preceding analyses have focused on: 
1) Developing methodologies for including irreparable and reparable rates (with anticipated 
repair times) in system-level risk modeling to ensure the radiation effects in electronics 
are not a significant mission risk contributor.   
2) Applying the results of parametric system-level risk modeling to guide the SEE 
component test and analyses efforts to ensure the limits used in the model are bounding.   
In addition, several trends and conclusions emerge from the modeling results of Section 7.1.   
1. The additive nature of failure rates in a series system means different causes impact 
system outage and failure probabilities in proportion to these rates.   
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a. Example: if a system has a non-electrical failure probability of 1 in 200 missions 
and SEEs cause 1 in 20,000 missions to fail (i.e., 1% of the non-avionics causes), 
the expected missions between failures reduces from 200 to 198 (a 1% change). 
b. The additivity of SEE rates also means that in the absence of test data to the 
contrary, the unit rates for destructive and nondestructive SEE increase with the 
numbers of potentially susceptible parts used in the unit. 
2. Because multiple component failures must occur to cause failure in a redundant system, 
system failure probability increases nonlinearly with the component failure rate. This has 
several implications for the triplicate system studied here: 
a. System failure probability increases quadratically with the unit failure rate, 
including the SEE contributions.   
b. Even when the probability of accumulating multiple SEEs in a single repair time 
is small, the probability of such accumulation is not negligible if the mission is 
long enough (i.e., contains enough repair times).  
c. The system outage rate due to reparable events decreases linearly as repair time 
decreases.  
d. Outage and failure probabilities increase quadratically with mission duration, due 
to accumulation of random failures due to DSEE and other causes. 
3. For missions or mission phases where repair of NDSEE is not possible, all SEE modes 
cause a unit to go offline, and NDSEE dominate risk due to their typically higher rates. 
a. Short missions (e.g., launch vehicle) typically do not last long enough for SEE to 
accumulate and overcome redundancy. However, SEE can be the most significant 
cause of unit failures, degrading resiliency and/or capability and lowering mission 
success probabilities to unacceptably levels.  
b. For longer missions, a short mission phase where repair is not possible can 
significantly reduce the probability of mission success. 
4. When cross-strapping is used to improve system reliability, it is important to bound the 
SEE rates for the redundant units to ensure that the SEE rates do not dominate the 
element failure probability.     
5. If redundancy is used for different purposes, then the level of redundancy in the system 
may differ for those functions. 
a. Example: a 3-unit element can be used to ensure system availability and to correct 
SEE occurring in its units. The former has a 3:1 redundancy, while the latter 
function requires all three units to remain functional, so there is no fault tolerance 
for handling the SEE error correction. 
b. Example: Similarly, if the redundancy serves FDIR/voting purposes, then system 
availability will be reduced because SEE mitigation and FDIR often require the 
system to be removed from service for a repair time to resynchronize after a 
reparable error. 
  
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-17-01211 Page #:  41 of 45 
The above trends also suggest the following guidelines for system-level modeling and the use of 
modeling results to guide SEE test and analysis efforts. 
7.2.1 System Design, Modeling, and Analysis 
The following guidelines are suggested to maximize the value of system-level modeling for 
design and SEE testing and analysis efforts: 
1) Irreparable and reparable SEE rates should be included in system models.   
a. If a quantitative reliability assessment is used (e.g., RBD or PRA), then the SEE 
rates should be combined to the component or unit failure rates.   
b. Reparable SEE can be assessed using availability modeling by including the SEE 
rate and system repair/recovery times. 
2) Investigate the reliability and availability model sensitivities over a range of rates for 
reparable and irreparable events and recovery times to determine the level at which they 
significantly detract from mission success. 
a. In most systems, the non-electrical failure rate dominates and provides a natural 
scale for measuring the significance of failures arising due to DSEE, NDSEE, and 
other electrical causes. It is natural to define “significance” as a percentage of the 
non-electrical failure rate. 
3) System-level models should be sufficiently complex to reflect impacts of operating 
through different mission phases and with different levels of resilience. In particular: 
a. Models must include even short mission phases where system criticality does not 
permit NDSEE repair. NDSEE rates usually exceed DSEE rates by orders of 
magnitude, so such phases can significantly increase mission failure probability. 
b. Models must include the reduced reliability resulting from one or more units in a 
redundant element going offline, whether permanently due to an irreparable mode 
or temporarily to repair a reparable mode. 
c. DSEE and other irreparable modes accumulate over the mission, increasing 
failure rates as the mission progresses. 
d. It is important that simulations reflect the full duration of the mission. Not only 
can DSEE accumulate over time, but even if all SEE modes are recoverable and 
the probability of an outage occurring in a single repair time is small, the 
probability of an outage occurring during the mission may not be negligible if the 
mission is long enough. 
4)  If system redundancy serves multiple purposes, all of these purposes must be included in 
the system models, along with their interferences with each other. 
a. Example: A three-unit element can be used to ensure availability as well as to 
correct errors that occur within the units by voting. The availability usage has 3:1 
redundancy, while voting requires all three units to be functional and will be lost 
with the first unit failure (that is, no redundancy). 
b. Example: Often, recovery from a reparable SEE may require the entire system to 
be taken offline for repair and resynchronization, thereby impacting availability. 
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7.2.2 SEE Testing and Analysis 
The following guidelines for SEE testing and analysis are suggested to make best use of system-
level modeling results: 
1) Use results of system-level reliability and availability assessments to guide SEE test and 
analysis efforts. 
2) Bound the unit and system failure rates using available data to determine whether system 
SEE rates could affect failure rates unacceptably. Data sources should be prioritized as 
follows: 
a. Historical heavy-ion test data with suitable margin applied to rates (e.g., >2x for 
NDSEE, and >5x for DSEE). 
b. Heritage mission data can bound system failure rates if heritage environment 
bounds that of a proposed mission. Otherwise, nonlinear dependence of system 
failure rates on unit failure rates preclude use of heritage data. 
c. Historical proton SEE test data can bound system failure rates, provided the 
mission is short and DSEEs are not a significant concern with conservative 
analysis/margins. 
d. Data for similar and/or worst-case parts with conservative analysis/margins.  
i. Example: Although most parts have single-event latchup (SEL) rates in 
the ISS orbit <10-4 SEL per day, several parts exhibit rates ~0.01 SEL per 
day. 
3) Use testing and analysis approaches that are consistent with the program’s risk position 
and risk factors. 
a. Proton testing may be acceptable if the mission is short (i.e., hours to days), 
failure-tolerant, and has easily modeled system responses. 
b. Heavy-ion testing is likely required for selected parts if a mission has low failure 
tolerance (e.g., Class A or B), is longer than a few days, features complicated 
systems, and/or makes heavy use of technologies susceptible to DSEE. 
c. Risk factors that exacerbate risk and may increase the need for heavy-ion testing 
include:  
i. Increasing use of SOTA, COTS, or other technologies with unknown SEE 
susceptibilities. 
ii. Increasing radiation environment severity. 
iii. Increasing application criticality. 
iv. Increasing mission duration. 
4) Prioritize testing based on system-level simulation results and risk, ranking, and the 
expected benefit from the test. 
a. Identify critical parts, especially those used in systems that would affect multiple 
other systems or services.  
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b. Identify parts in heavy usage (e.g., used in >10 to 15% of functions), especially in 
critical applications. 
c. Assess the relative complexity of redundant units/elements as indicated by the 
number of functions/services the unit provides, and part count (especially parts 
susceptible to DSEE). All other things being equal, a complex unit will likely 
have a higher failure rate, thereby driving the system failure rate.  
d. Develop a metric for prioritizing heavy-ion testing according to its potential risk 
reduction. The metric may reflect the criticality of the application, the number of 
applications, and the relative complexity of the units where it is used. For 
example, the metric could be a weighted sum over all parts in the system, with the 
weights reflecting the part criticality and relative unit complexity. 
5) To minimize disruption to the design process, develop work-around or redesign strategies 
for use if one or more of the parts selected for test exhibits unacceptable SEE 
performance. 
8.0 Other Deliverables 
No unique hardware, software, or data packages, outside those contained in this report, were 
disseminated to other parties outside this assessment. 
9.0 Lessons Learned 
No applicable lessons learned were identified for entry into the NASA Lessons Learned 
Information System. 
10.0 Definition of Terms  
Availability Ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function 
under given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time 
interval, assuming required external resources are provided [IEC 
60050-191- 02-05] (NESC Team Note: does include repair cycles). 
Where reliability is specified in MTBF and maintainability in 
MTTR, availability equates to = MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR).  
DSEE  Destructive SEE includes all permanently destructive modes as well 
as nondestructive modes that cannot be repaired by the system 
whereby the system loses its function.   
Element An ensemble of multiple redundant units, which can perform its 
required task as long as the required number of units are operational. 
Non-reparable SEE  Includes all destructive modes as well as nondestructive modes that 
cannot be repaired by the system. 
NDSEE  Nondestructive SEE or Reparable SEE: A reparable mode is a 
nondestructive SEE from which the system can restore normal 
operation after a nominal repair time.   
  
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-17-01211 Page #:  44 of 45 
Reliability Probability that an item can perform a required function under given 
conditions for a given time interval [IEC 60050–191-12-01]  
(NESC Team Note: does not include repair cycles). 
Reparable SEE NDSEE from which the system can restore normal operation after a 
nominal repair time. 
Resilience The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, 
during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions. 
[Hollnagel, Erik; Resilience Engineering in Practice, 2010] 
SEB Single-Event Burnout—a potentially destructive SEE mode affecting 
a variety of transistor technologies. 
SEDR  Single-Event Dielectric Rupture—a destructive SEE mode in which 
an ion causes dielectrics in a semiconductor device to fail. 
SEGR  Single-Event Gate Rupture—a destructive SEE mode affecting 
MOSFETs and related technologies. 
SEE  Single-Event Effect—Occurs with a variety of consequences, ranging 
from a momentary disturbance, data corruption or loss of 
functionality (NDSEE) to catastrophic failure (DSEE).   
SEFI Single-Event Functional Interrupt—a temporary or permanent-but-
recoverable interruption in the normal functionality of a 
microelectronic device. 
SEL Single-Event Latchup, a potentially destructive, regenerative, 
parasitic failure mode affecting complementary metal-oxide-
semiconductor technologies. 
SET Single-Event Transient—a brief disturbance to the output of a 
semiconductor device. 
SEU  Single-Event Upset—a permanent-but-correctable corruption of one 
or more bits of data in a semiconductor device with bistable (0 or 1) 
storage cells. 
Stuck Bit Permanent and uncorrectable loss of functionality of a bit in a 
memory device; although uncorrectable, stuck bits do sometimes 
repair themselves (anneal). 
Survivability  A property of a system, subsystem, equipment, process, or procedure 
that provides a defined degree of assurance that the named entity will 
continue to function during and after a natural or man-made 
disturbance. [Federal Standard 1037C Glossary of 
Telecommunication Terms] (NESC Team Note: for space missions, 
the system must survive the expanded environment termed “survival 
temperature limits,” launch when launched in the “off” state, and 
when configured “off” as a cold spare or an on orbit spare.) 
Unit A box or other hardware designed to perform a designated task as 
part of a subsystem or system. 
  
  
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-17-01211 Page #:  45 of 45 
11.0 Acronyms List 
COTS   Commercial-Off-The-Shelf  
DSEE   Destructive SEE  
EDAC  Error Detection and Correction 
EDL  Entry, Descent, and Landing   
EEE  Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical 
FDIR   Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery 
FPGA   Field-Programmable Gate Array  
ISS   International Space Station 
MEAL  Mission, Environment, Application, and Lifetime 
MOSFET Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor 
MTBF  Mean Time Between Failure 
MTTR  Mean Time To Repair 
NDSEE Nondestructive SEE 
NESC  NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
PRA  Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
RAM   Random Access Memory 
RBD  Reliability Block Diagram 
ROM   Read Only Memory 
SCP   Self-Checking Pair 
SEDR  Single-Event Dielectric Rupture 
SEE  Single Event Effect 
SEFI  Single-Event Functional Interrupt 
SEGR  Single-Event Gate Rupture 
SET  Single-Event Transient 
SEU  Single-Event Upset 
SOTA  State-of-the-Art 
SWAP  Size, Weight, and Power 
TDT   Technical Discipline Team 
TMR  Triple-Modular Redundancy 
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